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Making Sense Of Reasonable Doubt: Understanding
Certainty, Doubt, And Rule-Based Bias Filtering
Yali Corea-Levy 1
I. Introduction: An Undelivered Promise
The Winship doctrine requires more than simply a trial ritual.
A doctrine establishing so fundamental a substantive constitutional
standard must also require that the factfinder will rationally apply
that standard to the facts in evidence.
~Justice Potter Stewart.2

J

urors are essentially asked to answer two questions when
deliberating the fate of an accused in a criminal trial:
(1) Do you think the defendant is guilty?; (2) If so, how
certain are you of their guilt—namely, are you certain
beyond a reasonable doubt?3
This article explores the feeling of certainty which jurors
rely on when making a determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal prosecutions. The descriptive portion of
this article is composed of three factual claims: (1) jurors are
left to rely on their feelings of certainty in reaching verdicts,
instead of coming to conclusions based on a well defined rule or
set of instructions because reasonable doubt is not well defined;
(2) the feeling of certainty
alone is an unreliable method
for determining the strength
or weakness of the case
presented; and (3) the fickle
nature of reasonable doubt
is further exacerbated by the
fecund existence of biases.
The prescriptive portion
of this article, crudely stated,
is to use a jury instruction
that requires the jury to create
a paradigmatic example of
reasonable doubt before the
facts of the case have been
presented. The jury would
subsequently be instructed by the judge to reference the
example and compare it to the specific facts presented.
The purpose of this two-step process is to create a
standard before biases have the ability to surreptitiously
affect the standard. Moreover, jurors will have a standard
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against which the feeling of certainty can be checked. The
empirical research supporting this prescription will be
explored throughout this article.
Section II provides a brief history of reasonable doubt to
illustrate its place and purpose in the criminal justice system.
Section III provides insight, through a linguistic analysis, into
the reasons that reasonable doubt is so hard to define, thus,
providing some of the tools necessary to solve the problem.
Section IV reviews research in the cognitive sciences that
demonstrates that the feeling of knowing is a poor indicator of
guilt or innocence.
Section V examines concrete biases found in jury trials
and the pervasive nature of biases in general. By implementing
findings in the cognitive and social sciences, the section demonstrates how biases about which we may be unaware nonetheless
affect the decisions we make, including coming to conclusions
of guilt and innocence in criminal trials.4
Section VI sets forth the first step toward the prescriptive
solution. It demonstrates how applying rule-based reasoning
can help filter out biases. Coupled with Section VII, which
further elaborates on
the implementation of
the jury instruction,
these two sections
constitute the prescriptive claim. Finally,
Section VIII addresses
a concern that may
remain. Specifically,
it addresses work by
Gregory Mitchell that
suggests people may
automatically correct
biases without ever
having the need to
consciously correct
them. This article argues that the malleability of the reasonable doubt concept creates fertile ground for conviction
decisions based on implicit biases that should play no role in
the decision making process.
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II. A Reasonable History
I find it rather unsettling that we are using a formulation that
we believe will become less clear the more we explain it.
~Jon Newman, Chief Judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit5
It is not hyperbole to say that life, liberty, and justice are
on the line in criminal cases. The risk of a false conviction or
an erroneous release of a criminal back into society rests on
the tenuous concept of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt”—a
concept so fragile that some courts have opined that any attempt
to define it could only lead to, at best, no clarification of the
concept and, at worst, further “confusion.”6
Yet, belief beyond a reasonable doubt has been a barometer
of justice in criminal cases since at least the mid-nineteenth
century.7 Reasonable doubt was put forth as a means of getting
a jury to meet a “moral certainty.”8 In turn, moral certainty
was seen as the highest possible degree of certainty attainable
when mathematical certainty was not possible.9 Thus, moral
certainty was the highest possible certainty attainable through
inductive inquiries, in contrast to mathematical certainty which
was the certainty attainable through strictly deductive reasoning
(i.e. formal logic and mathematics).10 For example, we can be
mathematically certain that five minus four equals one, but
only morally certain that the earth revolves around the sun.11 As
Professor Steve Sheppard has phrased it: “For a writer in 1800
to claim, ‘I am morally certain,’ roughly equates to my saying
two centuries later, ‘I am as certain as I can be, based on what
I have seen and heard.’”12
Regardless of whether the concept of moral certainty
clarifies that of reasonable doubt, beginning in the nineteenth
century the two concepts were viewed as wedded to—if not
synonymous with—one another.13 This is important for understanding the weight that reasonable doubt was meant to carry.
Reasonable doubt was supposed to mean the highest possible
level of inductive certainty.
Interestingly, the use of “reasonable doubt” may in fact
have been introduced to help the prosecution, not to prevent
wrongful convictions.14 Reasonable doubt was seen as more
favorable to prosecutors than other permissible instructions
such as the following given by John Adams: “Where you are
doubtful never act; that is, if you doubt the prisoner’s guilt,
never declare him guilty; this is always the rule, especially in
cases of life.”15 In short, “a reasonable doubt” allowed more
room for error than “any doubt.”16
Despite the reasonable doubt standard’s protracted usage,
the Supreme Court did not establish it as an explicit constitutional
standard until 1970 in the case of In re Winship.17 In Winship,
the Court held that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments allow for criminal convictions only
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where “proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary
to constitute the crime with which [one] is charged” has been
established.18 The Court reasoned that this heightened standard
of proof was necessary in criminal cases because “[t]he accused
during a criminal prosecution has at stake interest of immense
importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose
his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he
would be stigmatized by the conviction.”19
The opinion in Winship further supports the historical
weight of the standard by asserting the importance “in our free
society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs
have confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty
of a criminal offense without convincing a proper fact finder of
his guilt with the utmost certainty.”20 In a concurring opinion,
Justice Harlan reasoned that a standard higher than a “preponderance of the evidence” was needed because of “a fundamental
value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict
an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”21 However,
the Winship Court provided no guidance with respect to
a definition, leaving the language used to convey the concept
of “reasonable doubt” in the hands of the lower courts.22
Twenty-four years after Winship, the Court was given the
opportunity to clarify the reasonable doubt concept in Victor
v. Nebraska.23 Unfortunately, the Court did not take advantage
of that opportunity. The opinion begins with Justice O’Connor
acknowledging that “[a]lthough [reasonable doubt] is an ancient
and honored aspect of our criminal justice system, it defies easy
explication.”24 The opinion further asserts that the Constitution
neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor
requires a definition from trial courts.25 “Indeed, so long as the
court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant’s guilt
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the Constitution does not
require that any particular form of words be used in advising the
jury of the government’s burden of proof.”26
The closest thing to a standard found in the opinion is that
“[t]he Constitutional question . . . is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow
conviction based on proof insufficient to meet the Winship standard.”27 Thus, lower courts have a tremendous amount of latitude
when it comes to articulating reasonable doubt to jurors.28
Due to the latitude given to lower courts when implementing
reasonable doubt, court instructions have ranged broadly.29
For example, some state and federal courts have concluded
that instructions need not be given unless the jury requests an
instruction.30 Other courts require instructions in all cases.31
Yet other courts prevent the term from being defined even
when jurors who express confusion with the meaning of the
concept explicitly request an instruction.32 According to these
courts, defining reasonable doubt actually makes the concept
less clear to jurors.33 Given that experts in the field are unable
to reach a consensus on the definition, it is not surprising that
49

empirical evidence shows that jurors, often tasked with making the
decisions regarding the fate of the accused, do not understand
the concept, and often misapply it.34
The history of reasonable doubt thus reveals a concept of
great importance that has nonetheless been vaguely articulated.
It is with this significance and vagueness in mind that this article
advocates for a need to better “define” reasonable doubt.35 The
subsequent section will elucidate the reasons behind reasonable
doubt’s vagueness.

III. The Good, The Bad and the Reasonable:
Vague Words Galore
It is difficult, if not impossible, to so define [the term reasonable
doubt] as to satisfy a subtle and metaphysical mind, bent on
the detection of some point, however attenuated, upon which to
hang a criticism.
~Supreme Court of Virginia36
One of the primary challenges in attempting to standardize
reasonable doubt and to subsequently create a rule for applying
it is the term’s inherent vagueness.37 As a first step in devising
a definition for reasonable doubt, this section explains why the
problem arises.
It is no secret that the word “reasonable” is vague. Legal
scholars tend to treat vagueness with great trepidation, if not
outright disdain.38 Yet, logicians and philosophers since at least
Eubulides have recognized that vagueness is fecund.39 Take a
leg off of a chair—is it still a chair? How many pieces of a
car can one remove before it ceases to be a car? Almost any
object can be turned into a “vagueness problem.” Despite being
surrounded by vagueness, we seem able to refer to things with
general success. This is partly due to the surrounding context.
Although “a heap of sand” is vague, if a construction worker has
seen the hole that the sand is meant to fill, vagueness ceases to be
a practical challenge to fulfilling the request.40 It is through this
context that we come to “know” what is meant by the word “heap.”
Part of the confusion comes from the fact that English,
unlike some other languages, lacks an important linguistic
distinction. Namely, to “know” can mean either “knowledge by
acquaintance” or “knowledge by description.”41 In the “heap”
example, the construction worker knew what “heap” meant
through acquaintance, that is, she saw the specifications that
“heap” had to satisfy. In this sense, “heap” is self-explanatory.
However, attempting to define “heap” with words is a Sisyphean
task, leaving even the best definition wanting for more.
Understanding this distinction helps shed light on Justice
Stewart’s famous line in Jacobellis v. Ohio, “I know it when I
see it.”42 Stewart intuitively realized that defining pornography
was not an easy task, in part because it required knowledge by
50

acquaintance—one cannot fully understand the meaning of
pornography through words alone.43 It is doubtful that Stewart
was explicitly aware of the semantic distinction between the
two types of knowledge. He realized he knew what pornography
was, yet was still unable to develop an articulable definition.44
Similarly, “reasonable doubt” may seem deceptively easy
to understand, yet elusive when one tries to articulate with a
traditional definition. This is because it is a concept that is much
better understood through acquaintance than by description,
much like “pornography.”
In Section VII, the “definition” of reasonable doubt through
a jury instruction requiring jurors to come up with paradigmatic
examples will be explained. This section underscores the importance of such an unconventional jury instruction.

IV. Knowing! We Know. Or, On Being Certain
Despite how certainty feels, it is neither a conscious choice
nor even a thought process. Certainty and similar states of
“knowing what we know” arise out of involuntary brain mechanisms that, like love or anger, function independently of reason.45
~Robert A. Burton, Neuroscientist
Reasonable doubt is deeply interrelated with the feeling of
certainty.46 Thus, one would hope—and it often seems taken
for granted—that the feeling of certainty arises as a result of
well-founded reasoning. This section demonstrates the folly of
this assumption.

A.	Certainty and Accuracy: Unfaithful Lovers
Certainty is important to our analysis of reasonable doubt
because the feeling of certainty is what gives reasonable doubt
its seal of approval, and thus, is the putative executioner of
justice in criminal trials.47 If the criminal justice system has
implemented reasonable doubt solely for the sake of ensuring
a good night’s sleep to those deciding the fate of the accused,
then there is little need for further analysis. However, if we
are interested in truly achieving justice, an important question
arises: How well does the feeling of certainty correlate with
accuracy? Stated another way, how often is the feeling of being
correct, actually correct? This is a key question tackled by the
“overconfidence” literature.48 The literature on overconfidence
has produced hundreds of articles examining how and why
people tend to feel more certain about facts than they ought to.49
Thus, the literature can be an important source of information
with regard to the relationship between the feeling of certainty
and accuracy.
The term of art used to describe an individual’s feeling
of certainty in relation to their success rate is “calibration.”50
A person is well calibrated if her feeling of certainty directly
Fall 2012

correlates to the accuracy of her predictions.51 To use a concrete
example from the literature, if in the course of four days it rains
three times, then a weatherperson who predicted a 75% chance
of rain on each of those four days is well calibrated, while a person who predicted a 90% chance of rain is poorly calibrated.52
The research has found that at times of high confidence,
people tend to be poorly calibrated.53 In one study, subjects were
given a quiz with 180 questions, broken up into ten 18-question quizzes.54 The quiz questions were varied and the subject
matter included science, movies, history, sports, geography,
and music.55 The subjects were incentivized with cash for accurately predicting how well they would do.56 On average, when
the subjects felt 90.5% certain, they were only correct 73.1%
of the time.57 Of note, this 16.6% disparity between certainty
and accuracy is on the conservative end. Previous studies found
instances in which those who felt 90% certain their answers
were correct, correlated as low as 30% to 50% with accuracy.58
However, the author notes that the higher rate is consistent with
other research, because participants in this study had access to
some information regarding correlation between predictions
and success after different quizzes.59 Thus, the participants had
information that could help them become better calibrated.
Earlier studies also showed that when people made judgments with extreme confidence there was a poor correlation
with accuracy.60 For example, in the classic paper Knowing
with Certainty: The Appropriateness of Extreme Confidence,
researchers found that when subjects indicated they believed
the odds of being correct were 90.91% (10:1),61 subjects were
only correct 75% (3:1) of the time.62 Even when expressing
extremely high odds, such as a-million-to-one, subjects were
wrong almost 7% of the time.63
The calibration studies demonstrate that overconfidence
occurs frequently and is not merely a “statistical artifact.”64
Thus, the onus would seem to be on those who think jurors are
well calibrated. That is, when the jurors believe themselves to
be 99% certain of guilt, what makes the trial environment less
likely to produce a significant discrepancy with accuracy? The
effect of overconfidence with specific regard to complex legal
cases and its direct affect on reasonable doubt will be explored
below.

B.	Certainty in Uncertain Circumstances:
	Coherence Theory
There is a further empirical reason to believe that the feeling of certainty is poorly calibrated to accuracy and thus, the
reasonable doubt standard is weak. Since at least the mid-1980s,
cognitive scientists have found that our brains prefer our beliefs
to be certain as apposed to ambiguous.65 Specifically, when
people are presented with complex and ambiguous problems,
once the person feels the evidence is in favor of one side—no
matter how slight—there is a strong corresponding feeling of
Criminal Law Brief

certainty. More recently, Dan Simon, a law professor whose
research focuses on the intersection between law and psychology, has run empirical studies that have found coherence-based
reasoning occurring in subjects who were given ambiguous
criminal case hypothetical situations and asked to evaluate how
sure they were of their conclusion (either guilty or innocent).66
In Simon’s own words, “[c]oherence-based reasoning posits
that the mind shuns cognitively complex and difficult decision
tasks by reconstructing them into easy ones, yielding strong,
confident conclusions.”67 Thus, if jurors initially feel the evidence is ambiguous, but eventually lean slightly towards guilt,
“the evidence is bolstered from overall ambiguity to a belief
beyond a reasonable doubt.”68 Therefore, what was meant to be
the highest standard of proof possible in our legal system, has
been demoted to what, at best, is no stronger than a preponderance of the evidence.
Recounting the most relevant experiments from Simon’s
article will provide a better understanding of this neurological
phenomenon. First, the experimenters had the subjects take a
pre-test.69 The pre-test required subjects—all of whom were
jury eligible—to view seven apparently unrelated vignettes.70
At the end of each vignette, the subjects were asked to assess
the strength of certain inferences related to the vignette.71 For
instance, “a vignette that concerned an eyewitness identification
of a person was followed by a factual question about the likelihood that the identification was correct.” 72
Once the pre-test was finished, the subjects were asked to
act as jurors in a case requiring suspect identification.73 The
case had seven pieces of unrelated circumstantial evidence.
Four pieces were inculpatory and three were exculpatory.74
The evidence was designed to be “sufficiently multifarious and
balanced so as to create a complex case.”75 Furthermore, the
seven pieces of evidence in the case were designed to be “virtually identical” to the seven pieces of evidence presented to the
subjects in the first part of the experiment (unbeknownst to the
subjects).76
Subsequently, the subjects were presented with arguments
from counsel on both sides pertaining to the inferences from the
pieces of evidence.77 The subjects were then asked to “render
a verdict and rate their confidence in the decision.”78 Finally,
they were asked to determine the likelihood of a defendant’s
guilt as supported by each piece of evidence.79 Importantly, the
questions were designed to be “essentially identical” to those
in the pre-test.80
Despite the pre-test evidence and the subsequent evidence
being virtually identical, there was a significant shift in certainty.81 Namely, in the pre-test stage, the subjects who eventually decided on guilt seemed almost equally convinced by the
strength of the inculpating evidence as they did by the exculpating evidence.82 This was consistent with the experiment’s
design intent. Yet, at the point that subjects were asked to make
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a decision on guilt or innocence, those who decided on guilt felt
the inculpating evidence was very strong, while the exculpating
evidence was very weak.83 A similar effect was also found with
subjects who found for innocence.84
That is, while they found the evidence
in the pre-test relatively even, by the
time they had to make a decision they
felt the exculpating evidence was
significantly stronger.
These findings were predicted
and consistent with a previous experiment that used a similar design using
tort law.85 Similar to the aforementioned case, subjects in the pretest
did not show particularly strong
degrees of certainty, yet once they
were required to make a decision in
the second part of the test, “75 percent
of participants indicated that they had
maximal or next-to-maximal confidence in their verdicts; conversely,
only 5 percent indicated low or nextto-low confidence.”86
All these results bolster, and are
predicted by, the theory behind coherence-based reasoning.
That is, after spending time weighing ambiguous and relatively
complex evidence, subjects tended to feel strong degrees of
certainty despite their own initial impressions that the evidence
did not clearly point in favor of one verdict or the other.

for them.93 Additionally, the issue cannot be fully appreciated
without addressing an issue that further compounds the problems
presented in this section. Namely, a juror’s reasons for feeling
certainty with regard to guilt may rest
on unconscious biases, unbeknownst
to the juror.94 Therefore, the juror’s
ultimate feeling of certainty may be
premised on little more than a bias
that nudged them in one direction,
and due to human nature, produced a
strong feeling of knowing where such
a feeling was not warranted.95
The extent of the problem can
be summarized in two parts. First, in
ambiguous criminal cases, cognitive
science tells us that jurors will eventually feel strongly towards one side,
even if they initially felt the evidence
did not clearly indicate guilt or innocence.96 This is the aforementioned
problem. Second, unbeknownst to
jurors, their reasons for feeling that
one side may possess more credibility could rest on unconscious biases.97
Thus, their ultimate feeling of certainty may be premised on
little more than a bias that nudged them in one direction, and
due to human nature, produced a strong feeling of knowing.
The following section will look at the second part of the
problem: unconscious biases.

Thus, while this research
does not leave the

criminal legal system in

shambles, its findings are
sufficiently robust and

widespread that a legal

system in search of equity
must account for them.

C. The Extent of the Problem
While the research in cognitive science shines an unflattering light on our feelings of certainty, it is important not to
take these findings to extreme nihilistic conclusions. First,
the overconfidence research still finds a correlation between
the strength in the feeling of certainty and the accuracy of that
certainty.87 That is, the more certain one feels, the more likely
one is to be correct. Yet, this still comes with the caveat that there
is a dangerous disparity between the degree of certainty and
the degree of accuracy—a disparity that may lead to pernicious
effects in criminal trials.88 Second, the coherence research deals
with complex and ambiguous cases.89 That is, in straightforward
cases, the worries found in this research are much less applicable.90 This is quite consistent with the overconfidence research
that has found the polar opposite problem with straightforward
questions.91 Specifically, there seems to be an underconfidence
effect where people are presented with straightforward questions
they should feel quite confident about.92
Thus, while this research does not leave the criminal legal
system in shambles, its findings are sufficiently robust and
widespread that a legal system in search of equity must account
52

V. How Biases We Cannot See Affect
Conscious Decision Making
[M]ost of our behavior is governed by a cauldron of motives and
emotions of which we are barely conscious. Your conscious life,
in short, is nothing but an elaborate post-hoc rationalization
of things you really do for other reasons.
~V.S. Ramachandran, Neuroscientist 98
This section examines how our decisions can be affected by
superfluous facts. These irrational yet influential factors all fall
into the category “biases” in this article. The full impact of these
biases can only be appreciated in light of the preceding section. In particular, while these factors may seem to only slightly
tilt the scales of decision-making, these slight alterations may
eventually lead to feelings of certainty as illustrated above. The
psychological biases literature is expansive. Recently, its importance has been realized and incorporated in disciplines from
economics to philosophy and law.99 The theme that has attracted
such disparate disciplines is the fascinating implications they
Fall 2012

have for human reasoning.100 The work in human reasoning has
even led to a Nobel Prize in economics for one of its pioneers.101
Given the vastness of the literature, it would make little sense
to bombard the reader with dozens of studies. Instead, it will be
helpful to examine some pertinent and representational studies.

A. Biases in Rape Cases
Rape is one of the most heinous crimes one human being
can commit against another. The victim is tormented long after
the perpetration of the crime.102 The severity of the crime therefore makes it all the more disturbing to know that unconscious
biases can play a significant role in the final verdict.103
In one study cited by Jon Hanson and David Yosifon,
researchers found that jury-eligible subjects were significantly
less likely to find that a woman had been raped if the woman
was viewed as “more respectable.”104 Specifically, the subjects
found it more likely that a divorced woman had been raped than
a virgin or married woman.105 This seemingly unintuitive finding is actually compatible with a body of research known as
“just world theory.”106 In brief, the just world theory postulates
that as people, we tend to find explanations that are compatible
with the view that the world is just. Thus, subjects are more
willing to believe that a divorcee has been raped because it is
more compatible with a just world than a married woman or
virgin being raped—due to the latter two being perceived as
more virtuous.107
Another bias that seeps into rape cases is the beauty
bias.108 This bias is the favoring of individuals who are deemed
physically attractive over those who are considered physically
unattractive.109 Although more intuitive, it is equally disturbing.
In rape trials this plays out in the form of a jury more readily
believing an “ugly” man raped a “beautiful” woman than would
be the case if the man were deemed “handsome” and the woman
“ugly.”110 Thus, less attractive women are at a greater risk
of having their rapist found innocent and less attractive men are
at a higher risk of being found erroneously guilty.111

B.	Race-Based Biases
Implicit racial biases are most likely to come to mind
when people hear the word “bias.” The Implicit Association
Test (IAT), conducted out of Harvard University, is a research
methodology that studies race bias, amongst other biases, and
has become popular with legal scholars.112 One race-based IAT
that has been administered requires people to quickly associate
“Black names” with positive words, and “White names” with
negative words.113 Next, the task requires the opposite, quickly
matching Black faces to negative words and White faces to positive words.114 The program has found statistically significant
time differences.115 More explicitly, people tend to more quickly
attribute positive words to White names and more quickly
attribute negative words to Black names.116
Criminal Law Brief

However, even if this test is actually able to pick out
implicit biases, what we really care about as a society are
measurable pernicious effects of these biases.117 Thus, the
following is a sample of some of the pernicious effects of
unconscious biases. In their paper, Fair Measures, researchers
Jerry Kang and Mahzarin Banaji examine an experiment where
the outcome was readily explainable by IAT results. 118 The
researchers randomly assigned two hundred and ninety-one
medical interns “to view, read symptom profiles, and make
diagnosis and treatment recommendations for a hypothetical
Black or White patient.”119
Consistent with the population of the United States, a
significantly higher number of Black patients were diagnosed
with coronary artery disease (CAD) than White patients.120
Thus, an equitable distribution would require that a higher
number of Blacks receive the state-of-the-art treatment than
Whites, in order to stay proportional. Disturbingly however,
in proportion to the respective population of Black patients,
significantly fewer of these patients were prescribed the stateof-the-art treatment than White patients.121 Furthermore, “[t]he
most highly biased medical interns, as measured by the IAT,
were also more likely to treat White patients with [the stateof-the-art treatment], despite their own diagnoses of Black
Americans’ higher likelihood of” CAD.122
It is important to note that the medical interns were aware
that their evaluations were being scrutinized, and they therefore
had a strong incentive to at least appear unbiased, even if they
realized they harbored racist feelings.123 Thus, these biases are
likely something the interns were completely unaware of, yet
could have a profound effect on people’s lives.
It would be surprising if biases found in highly educated
professionals under scrutiny would somehow disappear when
jury eligible citizens stepped in a courtroom—especially given
that the guardian of equity (the reasonable doubt standard) is
woefully lacking in its current iteration. Fortunately, there is
little need for major inferences, since a recent article by Justin
D. Levinson, Huajian Cai, and Danielle Young has specifically
tested whether race plays a role in jury decision-making with
respect to guilt.124
Amongst other tasks, sixty-seven jury eligible students
took an IAT that measured the correlation between Black and
guilty.125 The IAT results “suggest that participants held an
implicit association between Black and Guilty.”126 However,
this alone would not be sufficiently interesting without reasons
to believe that such implicit biases would lead to pernicious
consequences. To test this, researchers designed vignettes with
either a White defendant or a Black defendant.127 These vignettes
included several pieces of evidence, which were identical
in both iterations of the vignette.128 The participants were asked
to indicate how pertinent certain evidence was towards an assessment of guilt.129 The study found that “having stronger implicit
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associations between Black and Guilty…predicted judgments
of ambiguous evidence as more indicative of guilt.”130 Finally,
the implicit nature of these biases is underscored by a surprising
finding. Namely, researchers found that “implicit attitudes of
race and guilt are quite different than attitudes of race revealed
by using explicit measures—in fact, one explicit measure even
showed opposite results—participants who felt warmer towards
African Americans actually showed more bias on the Guilty/
Not Guilty IAT.”131

often suggested to the subjects that a certain feature, such as
order, could have had an effect; yet they denied being aware of
the order at anytime.145 Another example comes from a study
conducted by Kenneth Mathews and Lance Canon. 146 The
researchers found that when ambient noise levels were normal
(approximately 50db), people were almost five times as likely to
help an apparently injured individual than when ambient noise
was loud (approximately 87db).147 As one researcher has noted,
“[t]hese experiments are not aberrational, but representative.”148

C.	Miscellaneous Biases

D.	Reasonable doubt coupled with implicit biases

It may be tempting to focus on specific biases and attempt
to counteract them. Such counteraction could range from calls
for greater governmental regulation to try and counterweigh the
unconscious influences consciously132 to jury nullification.133
Even assuming that these counter measures have equitable
consequences, the problem of identifying all the biases that exist
would be a daunting, if not impossible, task. This is because
the psychological biases literature makes it clear that biases are
fecund,134 as will be illustrated below.
Due to our heightened awareness of race and sex biases,
studies concerning biases have tended to focus on these two
areas. By their very nature, however, unconscious biases are
difficult to ascertain outside of formal studies.135 Furthermore,
devising a study presupposes that the researcher believes the
study will yield interesting results.136 Thus, only the factors
which researchers assume may be susceptible to biases will be
studied. To get a sense of how pervasive and surprising some
of the biases can be, it may help to take a glimpse outside of the
narrow scope of jury trials.
For example, in one study discussed in the classic paper
Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental
Processes,137 researchers Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahnemen
found that the order in which products were placed in a
consumer survey created a bias.138 Researchers spread identical
dresses in one study, and nylons in another so that they were
in a row.139 Subjects were then asked to pick the “best quality”
product.140 Subjects were found—particularly in the nylon
study—to heavily over-choose from the right side.141
This outcome occurred despite the fact that all the products
were identical. Nisbett and Wilson noted that, “[w]hen asked
about the reasons for their choices, no subject ever mentioned
spontaneously the position of the article in the array.”142
Subjects denied being influenced by the position of the article
even when specifically asked, “usually with a worried glance
at the interviewer suggesting that they felt either that they had
misunderstood the question or were dealing with a madman.”143
The paper recounted dozens of experiments, all of them tied
by the theme of people who were consistently unaware as to
why they chose what they had chosen, or felt the way they had
felt.144 This was particularly surprising because researchers

The only assurance of equity, and only barrier against
implicit biases, is the fact that reasonable doubt is uniformly
implemented. Due to its malleability, however, the reasonable
doubt standard tends to be little more than a façade.149
Furthermore, it is also highly unlikely that the disparities we see
in such studies are due to jurors not caring. Studies show that
jurors really do try and apply the standards, but genuinely have
trouble understanding jury instructions—if provided to them at
all.150 The eventual prescription compels jurors to essentially
create their own definition of reasonable doubt by imagining
what types of evidence would amount to beyond a reasonable
doubt.151 This mental exercise is done before the facts of the
case are known, thus preventing the biases from creeping into
the reasonable doubt analyses.
Again, the extent of the problem can be summarized in two
parts. First, in ambiguous criminal cases cognitive science tells
us that jurors will eventually feel strongly towards one side,
even if they initially felt the evidence did not clearly indicate
guilt or innocence.152 This was the problem articulated in Section
IV. Second, unbeknownst to jurors, their reasons for favoring
one side may possess more credulity based on unconscious
biases—the problem articulated in this section.153 Thus, their
ultimate feeling of certainty may be premised on little more
than a bias that nudged them in one direction, and due to human
nature, produced a strong feeling of knowing.
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VI. Setting Standards through
“Rule-Based Bias Filtering”
This section demonstrates how utilizing rule-based
reasoning can help minimize the extent to which biases play a
role in our reasoning. In conjunction with Section VII—which
explains both how reasonable doubt can be defined and used as
a rule—this section constitutes the prescriptive claim.
The biases that lead us to convict some individuals when
there is little evidence against them and exonerate others when
there is a plethora of evidence against them can incite various
reactions. Some may see the radical cost of revamping the legal
system as too high, and thus downplay the extent to which these
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biases undermine the very foundations of this legal system.154
Others may call for counter and compensatory measures such
as jury nullification in cases where biases are likely to occur in
favor of the prosecution.155 Fortunately, by standardizing the
reasonable doubt concept, many of the biases can be ameliorated, without having to choose between doing nothing, and
possible over-compensation.156
This idea can be illustrated using one of the aforementioned
biases. For example, if we were to introduce a rule for lending
aid to people, it could help us eliminate the bizarre environmental noise bias found in the Mathews and Canon study.157
An aid-lending rule could be formulated as follows: “When
someone needs help, always assist unless doing so would make
you late to an important engagement or otherwise harm you.”
The merits of the rule are not of importance. What is important
is that by having a rule and following it, the rule may override
the biases.158 Thus, a subject who applies this rule may still walk
by someone who needs help while ambient noise is heightened
and feel no inclination to help. However, having the rule in
mind gives them a reason to override the lower level bias. 159
The feeling is the same, but now our subject has an anchor by
which they may effectively filter out the irrelevant “noise”—
both figuratively and literally.
Note that this solution does not
require the individual to be aware of
the bias. In fact, there could be biases
related to aid rendering that are produced by what we had for breakfast,
the laundry detergent we use, or the
color of our underwear. An individual
may be aware that they are not inclined to help the person in distress,
but they need not know why in order
to successfully apply the rule. What is
needed is a contextual cue that triggers the explicit aid-lending rule and
that the prospective aider follows the
rule. In this case, the cue is noticing
an individual in distress. In a jury trial,
the cue is an explicit jury instruction.
Importantly, there is an inverse
correlation between the precision of
the rule and the flexibility of the rule.
There is also a positive correlation
between the flexibility of a rule and
the amount of biases that can seep in.
For example, suppose if instead of
the aforementioned assistance rule, we replaced it with: “Help
someone anytime you feel like it.” Such a vague rule makes a
person just as susceptible to bias influence as a person with no
rule. Imagine creating a rule meant to protect one from wily

sales persons, well-versed in cognitive biases. A rule lacking
flexibility might be stated as: “Under no circumstance will you
spend more than $200.” As long as one sticks to the rule, a
person can feel secure that they will not spend more than they
had planned on. Compare that to a rule that states: “Spend no
more than seems reasonable.” While this rule has much greater
flexibility, it comes at the cost of doing very little to protect
against biases.
The problem carries over to the reasonable doubt concept.
The more narrowly one defines reasonable doubt, the less the
standard is susceptible to biases; but it may also become less
flexible.160 So how can reasonable doubt keep a degree of flexibility while having the rigidity necessary for rule-based bias
filtering to work? The following section provides an answer.

VII. Using Knowledge by Acquaintance
to Standardize Reasonable Doubt
This section explains how knowledge by acquaintance can
be used to define reasonable doubt and serve as a rule through
which rule-based bias filtering may occur.161 Furthermore, the
section ends by dispelling a possible
concern arising out of the literature.
From the lack of a clear definition, it is apparent that reasonable
doubt cannot be simply defined using
words. As one author has observed,
“[a]ttempts to define reasonable doubt
simply establish ‘analytic connections
between words and words[’] that
belie the concept’s inherent quality
of vagueness.”162 Instead of words,
a jury instruction requiring jurors to
come up with concrete examples that
serve as definitions should be used.
These examples act as definitions and
rules, thus allowing rule-based bias
filtering to occur. Jurors still have the
ultimate deciding power with regard
to whether the criteria are met, but instead of just relying on the unreliable
feeling of certainty, they can rely on
an illustrative definition.163
Thinking of cases where we
would all find a suspect guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt is not difficult. For
example, a suspect is caught on a clear video recorder committing a crime, DNA evidence is found at the scene implicating
the suspect, the suspect had a motive, and there was no evidence
that undermined those facts. We can also think of cases in which
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instruction requiring
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thus allowing rule-based
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we definitely would not feel comfortable finding someone
guilty beyond reasonable doubt. For example, a case where no
plausible motive is given and the only evidence is a witness
who saw the individual in the area shortly after the crime was
committed. Yet, when jurors are asked to come to a decision of
guilt or innocence they rely on their unreliable feelings.164
The examples are meant to use the juror exemplars as
anchors to create positive guidelines. Much like it is better
before one steps into a store to think about what she is willing
to pay for an item, it is much better to think about what counts
as reasonable doubt before the trial begins.
These anchors achieve at least three things. One, jurors
create a standard that can be turned into a rule like the rules
that were explored earlier, thus helping to filter out biases.
Specifically, jurors can be instructed that they should not find
guild beyond a reasonable doubt, “unless the evidence presented
is comparable to that of your reasonable doubt exemplar.” Two,
by creating the rule before the facts of the trial are known by
the jury, it is less likely that unconscious biases will weigh into
its formulation.165 Finally, the flexibility of the standard is kept.
Jurors create their own exemplars, thus the worries about stripping the jurors of their ability to use personal beliefs is gone.166
The idea of conscious thoughts (rules in the present case)
acting to essentially veto lower level thoughts is one supported
by neuroscientific research.167 The neurophysiologist Benjamin
Libet’s research putatively demonstrated that our conscious
“will” to act occurs only after the neural commands for triggering
that act have occurred.168 Yet, he conceded that his research
supported the idea that higher order (conscious) thoughts could
act as a veto mechanism even once the lower order neural
commands have been triggered.169 Bolstering this position,
the neurologist John Burton concurs with the aforementioned
opinion adding, “[i]f you see conscious thoughts as being
subsequent inputs into the hidden layer, you can see where a
conscious decision can then be incorporated into unconscious
decision-making.”170
There is also research at the higher order cognitive levels
showing that mental models work.171 One study found that
while “[d]irect approaches, like informing participants of the
existence of the bias and imploring them to “try harder” or to
“be unbiased” have been generally unsuccessful, some success
has been obtained with techniques that induce participants to
actively create mental models in which they imagine alternative conclusions by urging them to consider the correctness
of the opposite conclusion and to note the weaknesses of their
preferred conclusion.”172 The exemplars would work as alternative conclusions where needed, that is, where the case at hand
deviates from the mental model. If a case does not deviate from
the model, there is no need to imagine alternatives, because
by comporting with the mental model, the reasonable doubt
standard has been achieved.
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Further support for this idea comes from an unlikely
candidate, viz. Gregory Mitchell.173 Mitchell, who criticizes
much of the research in implicit biases used in the legal context,
points out that part of what makes us uniquely human is our
ability to correct inaccurate (or biased) thoughts through higher
order thoughts.174 In short, while humans may have unconscious
biases, it is not always clear that the biases affect our decision
making, because we are able to self correct with these “second
thoughts.”175
Mitchell’s criticism supports the prescriptive claim that
conscious mental models can serve to override conscious
biases.176 The rules used in rule-based bias filtering are second
thoughts that are used to correct potentially pernicious biases.177
In Mitchell’s own words, use of “mechanical rules and decision
aids…[make] it more likely that simple computational errors
and inappropriate weighting of data points will be avoided.”178
Thus, although Mitchell would generally be viewed as a critic
of the bias literature in the law, his findings actually support this
article’s prescriptive claim.
Although Mitchell’s research bolsters the prescriptive
claim, his views may seem to undermine the descriptive claim.179
Namely, Mitchell thinks people may automatically correct for
biases without ever having the need to consciously correct for
them.180 He argues that cognitive biases are overstated because
we can correct for such biases.181 Yet, he does not seem to
provide any data that shows we are more likely than not to filter
out biases. Furthermore, findings such as those in the work of
Kang and Benaji182 evidence the fact that these biases may creep
in even if we take conscious steps to counter them.183
Additionally, while we may be well aware of sex and race
biases, there may be many biases whose effects we do not fully
comprehend or even know about (e.g. beauty bias, weight bias,
tattoo bias).184 Even for unconscious correction to occur under
Mitchell’s model there must be some impetus—conscious or
unconscious—that results in second thoughts that correct for
such biases.185 Assuming a strong impetus to correct for biases we are completely unaware of seems foolhardy. Thus, in
addition to Mitchell’s arguments lending support to this article’s
prescriptive claim, the arguments do little to undermine the
descriptive claim.
Admittedly, there will always be borderline cases that are
not only difficult to decide, but which open the door for biases
our mental models may not foresee. Therefore, the goal is not to
eliminate implicit biases, but to ameliorate them. Furthermore,
this solution need not be the only solution. The hope is that it will
help compliment other solutions such as graphical illustrations
and instructions simplified with the help of psycholinguistics.186
In particular, jurors should be reminded that those accused
of crimes need not show any evidence supporting their innocence because they are presumed to be innocent. Also, it may
help to frame reasonable doubt against the other standards such
Fall 2012

as preponderance of the evidence. Both of these clarifications
are easy to explain and are of the utmost importance because
jurors are often found to not understand them.187 With jury
instructions that take these standards into account, jurors will
have sufficient individual flexibility while still being able to
avoid some of the pernicious effects caused by implicit biases.
This solution is compatible with a reasonable doubt standard
that changes based on the severity of a crime or sentencing (a cost-benefit model of reasonable doubt).188 This could
be achieved by giving the jury information while they are
constructing their reasonable doubt exemplars, so as to influence these mental models. For example, “while thinking about
what constitutes a reasonable doubt, one should keep in mind
that the current case carries with it the possibility of death.”189
Jurors would thus be free to take the penalty into consideration
when constructing their reasonable doubt mental model.190

VIII. Conclusion
The inherent vagueness of reasonable doubt leaves jurors
with nothing more to rely on than their gut feelings of
certainty.191 While these feelings of certainty may sometimes
rest on well-founded reasons, research in cognitive science
shows that such feelings are no guarantee of cogent reasoning
or accuracy.192 Particularly in factually complex and ambiguous
cases, juror’s feelings may be unconsciously swayed by biases.
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that it is quite likely
that laypersons and experts alike have several biases that have
never been considered.193 In such ambiguous cases, research
also reveals that jurors are likely to experience strong feelings
of certainty, not due to factual clarity, but instead due to the
nature of the human cognitive architecture.194
Fortunately, a standard can be created once it is realized
that “reasonable doubt,” while not amenable to a customary
definition, can become an explainable standard by providing
jurors with examples. Specifically, jurors can be instructed to
create concrete exemplars of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
through which they may evaluate their final conclusions.
Cognitive science leads us to believe that such a strategy (rulebased bias filtering) will help jurors reassess conclusions that
strongly diverge from the exemplars. This is significant because
such divergence is indicative of the fact that the conclusions
were by-products of biases.
Finally, rule-based bias filtering through exemplars is not
mutually exclusive with other putative solutions to the problem.
Despite the impressive benefits of rule-based bias filtering, it
is essential to stay open to the fact that empirical research may
lead to further solutions. At the very least, empirical research
may help maximize the manner and timing in which reasonable
doubt mental models are constructed.
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